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SPORTS VIOLENCE, CONSENT AND THE CRIMINAL 
LAW! 
It is generally accepted that in the course of sporting endeavour the use of 
force is pennitted which in other circumstances would be unlawful. 
Applications of force which would normally be criminal assaults are lawful 
when inflicted in the course of a game. The traditional explanation has been 
that the law recognises the consent of the participants as providing a defence. 
By the same token, it is accepted (with increasing regularity) that there are 
limits to the amount offorce which might lawfully be inflicted in the course 
of a game and it is said that participation in sport does not confer a licence to 
abandon the restraints of civilisation. Thus, there is a point beyond which the 
consent of the participant is considered immaterial and the conduct is treated 
as unlawful. The issue has been highlighted by recent well-publicised 
incidents in both rugby union and soccer.2 A realisation of the serious 
consequences, in terms of injuries3 and economic 10ss,4 of violent play 
reinforces public concern. In this essay I propose to examine the issue of 
criminal liability for violent conduct in the sports arena. In particular, I shall 
I. This is a revised and expanded version of a paper delivered at the Irish Association of Law 
Teachers' conference in Dublin, November 1993. My gratitude is due to those who 
participated in and made valuable contributions to the discussion. The assistance of Eoin 
McCann, former cricket selector and rugby referee. must also be acknowledged. All errors 
remain my sole responsibility. 
2. In the past few months a number of incidents have been highly publicised. The tour ofthe 
New Zealand "All Blacks" was accompanied by allegations of violent fouls being 
committed by them on England players Phillip de Glanville and Kyran Bracken. Some 
months earlier controversy attended the British and Irish Lions' tour to New Zealand 
where English player Dean Richards was accused of raking Frank Bunce. whose ear 
required stitching. In November 1993 John Fashanu. then of Wimbledon FC. was reported 
to the Football Association for an elbow challenge which seriously injured Tottenham 
Hotspur player Gary Mabbutt; see The Independent, I December 1993; also The 
Guardian, "This sporting strife", 15 December 1993. For a summary of similar recent 
controversies in North America see Nielsen. "Controlling sports violence: too late for 
carrots - bring on the big stick" (1989) 74 Iowa L Rev 681 at 683-86; also Hechter. "The 
criminal law and violence in sports" (1979) 19 Crim LQ 425. 
3. A recent survey of sports injuries in Ireland attributes 14 per cent of injuries to foul play 
and "unsportsmanlike" conduct; a further 6 per cent are the result of foul tackles; see 
Watson. "Incidence and nature of sports injuries in Ireland" (1993) 21 Am] Sports Med 
137. An earlier survey of sports injuries in Irish schoolchildren concluded that illegal play 
was a major cause of injury in schools matches and a call was made for stricter 
enforcement of the rules by referees and other officials; see Watson. "Sports injuries 
during one academic year in 6799 Irish school children" (1984) 12Am] Sports Med 65. 
4. A number of civil actions between professional soccer players have been initiated in 
England. Paul Elliott of Chelsea brought an action against Dean Saunders of Aston Villa; 
see [1992] All ER Rev 365. Drake J dismissed Elliott's claim; see The Guardian, II June 
1994. Most recently Peter Beardsley of Newcastle United was reported to be considering 
action against Neil Ruddock of Liverpool; see The Independent, 26 November 1993. 
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focus on the liability of participants for offences against the person. The 
potential liability of coaches, clubs, officials and sports associations is 
beyond the scope of the essay, as is the question of liability for public order 
offences. 
DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The background to the application of the criminal law to sport can be 
traced to the old writers who acknowledge the lawfulness of certain activities 
as being "manly diversions".5 This must be read in the context of a concern 
to declare activities such as duelling, prize-fighting and fencing with naked 
swords unlawful. Moreover, at the time the organisation and regulation of 
sport with which we are familiar today was unknown.6 But in practice the 
intrusion of the criminal law into the sports arena was minimal and little 
authority existed on the point. By the end of the last century, however, it had 
become judicially acknowledged in these islands that the criminal law 
applies to sports conduct. In R v Bradshaw7 the accused during a football 
game jumped in the air and struck an opponent in the stomach with his knee; 
the latter died from a rupture of the intestines. Although the case resulted in 
an acquittal, Bramwell U's direction to the jury that the act would be 
unlawful if it was intended to cause serious hurt confirmed the applicability 
of the criminal law to sport. A successful prosecution was brought 20 years 
later in R v Moore8 where the accused was convicted of manslaughter, when 
death resulted from a violent tackle during a football game. While those 
cases involved fatalities resulting from violent play the broader reach of the 
criminal law implicit in the rulings is confirmed in the celebrated decision in 
R v Coney. 9 There the' 'sport" of bare-knuckle prize-fighting was held to be 
unlawful, with the result that those attending thereat were guilty of aiding 
and abetting. Included amongst the reasons for holding prize fighting 
unlawful were the potential threat to the public peace which the activity 
5. See Foster Crown Law. p 260; per Russell on Crime, 12th ed (London, 1964) p 679: 
"[tlhus if two, by consent, play at cudgels or single-stick, or wrestling and one happens to 
hurt the other, it would not amount to a battery, as their intent was lawful and 
commendable in promoting courage and activity" (footnote omitted). 
6. The modern organisation of sport began .in a semi-formal fashion in the English public 
schools in the I 820s and 1830s. In the latter half of the last century the major sporting 
associations were founded. The Football Association was founded in 1863, the Rugby 
Football Union in 1871, the Queensbury rules were drafted in 1865-67. A sense of the 
earlier robust nature of sports contests is found in Crudden, Macmillan Dictionary ojSport 
and Games (London, 1980) p 32, who notes a football game in 1793 between six players 
from Sheffield and six from Norton which lasted three days and ended in a brawl in which 
serious injuries were inflicted. Gaelic football shares a similarly combative history and 
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries inter-parish games, often involving 
hundreds of participants, frequently bordered on faction fighting. The rules of gaelic 
football were drafted by Daniel and Maurice Davin (in consultation with others) after they 
had witnessed an especially violent 34-a-side match between two teams from Tipperary 
and Waterford. The Gaelic Athletic Association was founded sometime thereafter in 
1884. 
7. (1878) 14 Cox CC 83. 
8. (1898) 14 TLR 229. 
9. (1882) 8 QBD 534. 
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posed, that the blows were struck in anger and that the blows were calculated 
to cause harm. Prize-fighting was distinguished from other forms of sporting 
activity which the court indicated are lawful. 10 Thus, Cave J referred to 
"boxing with gloves in the ordinary way", Stephen J to "sparring with 
gloves", and Hawkins J to "an amicable spar with gloves". The distinction 
between that which is lawful and that which is not was summarised by 
Stephen J: I1 
... the consent ofthe person who sustains the injury is no defence ... if the injury 
is of such a nature, or is inflicted under such circumstances, that its infliction is 
injurious to the public as well as the person injured. But the injuries given and 
received in prize-fights are injurious to the public, both because it is against the 
public interest that the lives and health of the combatants should be endangered 
by blows, and because prize-fights are disorderly exhibitions, mischievous on 
many grounds. Therefore the consent of the parties to the blows which they 
mutually receive does not prevent those blows from being assaults .... In cases 
where life and limb are exposed to no serious danger in the common course of 
things, I think that consent is a defence to a charge of assault, even when 
considerable force is used, as, for instance, in cases of wrestling, single-stick, 
sparring with gloves, football and the like .... 
While these remarks must be read in the context of boxing as it was then 
known they indicate an acceptance by the law of the use of some degree of 
force in sport. By the same token use of excessive force is unlawful despite 
the rules of the game or the consent of the participants. Thus, the consent of 
the fighters which could clearly be inferred from their participation in the 
prize-fight had no bearing on the question of its lawfulness, as the degree of 
force clearly exceeded that envisaged by the court as being permissible. 
This trilogy of cases set the framework for the application of the criminal 
law to violence in the sports arena. Moreover, the courts expressed the view 
that the accused would be liable whether the violence was within the rules of 
the game or not. Coney confirms that the law does not contine itself to fatal 
violence and that the law sets limits to the capacity of participants to consent 
to the imposition of violence. The broad approach was endorsed in 
subsequent decisions which dealt with the defence of consent on a more 
general basis. While it has been established that consent to force which is 
likely to result in bodily harm does not afford a defence, the courts have 
recognised lawfully constituted sports and games as an exception to that 
rule. This point which was implicit in R v Donovan l2 became explicit in 
Attomey-General's Reference (No 6 of 1980) where the English Court of 
Appeal stated: 13 
... in our judgment it is immaterial whether the act occurs in private or in public; 
it is an assault if actual bodily harm is intended and/or caused. Nothing which we 
have said is intended to cast doubt upon the accepted legality of properly 
conducted games and sports ... [The] exception can be justified ... as needed in 
the public interest ... 
10. See also Hunt v Bell (1822) I Bing I; R v Young (1866) 10 Cox CC 371; R v Onon (1878) 
39 LT 293. 
II. (1882) 8 QBD 534 at 549. 
12. [1934) 2 KB 498. 
13. [1981) QB 715 at 719. 
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More recently, the House of Lords confirmed the general rule in R v 
Brown. 14 In the course of their speeches several of the Law Lords expressly 
noted that sporting contests and games remain an exce~tion where the 
consent of the recipient of the violence negates liability. I 
Despite the development of this legal framework for sports violence few 
prosecutions were brought until comparatively recently. This might well 
reflect a traditional reluctance to invoke the law in sport and a view that the 
question of sports violence is better dealt with by disciplinary action on the 
part of the relevant governing bodies. Nevertheless, the seriousness and 
quantum of injuries caused through violence, coupled, no doubt, with an 
awareness of their economic consequences, probably made a change in 
prosecutorial policy inevitable. The trickle of cases that emerged in England 
and Wales in the late 1970s has gradually but steadily increased. It began in 
R v Billinghurst l6 where the accused punched an opponent during a rugby 
game, breaking his jaw. He was found guilty despite testimony from Mervyn 
Davies, the Welsh former international, that punching is a common 
occurrence in rugby. In R v Bishop the accused, a Welsh international rugby 
player, pleaded guilty to common assault for an "off the ball" incident in 
which he punched an opponent while the latter lay on the ground. His 
sentence of one month's imprisonment was varied to one of 12 months' 
suspended by the Court of Appeal. In R v Johnson the accused who bit an 
opponent's ear during a rugby tackle was found guilty of grievous bodily 
harm and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. 17 The intrusion on the 
criminal law has not been confined to rugby· football; association football 
players, both amateur and professional, have been convicted. IS In R v 
Birkin l9 the accused ran after and struck an opponent who had late-tackled 
14. [1993] 2 All ER 75. The bodily hann threshold has been accepted in a number of 
common-law jurisdictions: see R v Raabe [1985] Qd R 115; R v Watson (1986) 69 ALR 
145; R v Nazif[1987] I NZLR 122; R. v lobidon (1991) 66 CCC (3d) 454. Despite the 
abundance of authority the rule has been criticised by commentators: see eg Glanville 
Williams, "Consent and public policy" [1962] Crim LR 74 and 154; Leigh, 
"Sado-masochism, consent and the reform of the criminal law" (1976) 39 MLR 130; 
Devereux, • 'Consent as a defence to assaults occasioning bodily hann - the Queensland 
dilemma" (1987) 14 UQdU 151. 
15. Ibid., 79 (per Lord Templeman); 89-90 (Per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle); 108-9 (per 
Lord Mustill). 
16. [1978] Crim LR 553. 
17. These and other cases are recorded in Grayson, "The day sport dies" (1988) 138 NU9; 
see also Grayson, "Keeping sport alive" (1990) 140 NU 12; Grayson, Sport and the law. 
2nd ed (London, 1988) pp 125-36; Gardiner, "The law and the sports field" [1994] Crim LR 
513; Osborough, "Sport, freedom and the criminal law" in Whelan, ed, Law and Liberty in 
Ireland (Dublin, 1993), p 37. R v Gingell (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 198 involved a guilty plea 
and the report mainly concerned the question of sentence. Sports violence has also been 
considered by the English Criminal Injuries Compensation Board who drew attention to 
the matter in their 23rd report. An award made to a rugby player whose injury resulted 
from a severe blow is noted in (1991) 141 NU 1725. Reports ofthe Irish Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Tribunal do not disclose such information, but I am aware of several such 
claims having been initiated. 
18. R v Kamara (1989), professional soccer player fined £1200 and ordered to pay £200 
compensation; R v Chapman (1989), 18 months' imprisonment for kicking an opponent's 
head in a soccer game; see (1990) 140 NU 12. 
19. (1988) 10 Cr App R (S) 303. 
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him. On a plea of guilty to assault occasioning actual bodily harm he was 
sentenced to eifcht months' imprisonment, reduced on appeal to six months. 
In R v Shervill 0 the accused who kicked an opponent and pleaded guilty to 
unlawful wounding was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, reduced by 
the Court of Appeal to two months. In both cases the Court of Appeal was 
emphatic in its view that violence on the sports field would be considered to 
be as serious a matter as violence off it. But despite the volume of sports 
violence cases the law still remains vague. In particular, the point at which 
force becomes criminal has not been clearly identified, nor has the question 
of the participants' consent been satisfactorily resolved. This, no doubt, is a 
consequence of several factors: most of the recorded cases were decided at 
first instance; most cases involve that which could only be regarded as 
excessive violence which caused quite serious injuries; and in many cases 
the accused pleaded guilty and, thus, the principal issue was that of 
sentence.21 
In Ireland few cases have reached the courts and the law is 
correspondingly undeveloped. Gaelic football provided the setting for one 
case, The People (DPP) v McCarthy.22 There the accused was said to have 
kicked an opponent on the ground. A team-mate of the latter,pushed the 
accused away and received a punch for his efforts. The accused was 
dismissed by the referee and the victim suffered a fractured jaw. The accused 
was found guilty of common assault and, having paid the victim £5,000 
compensation prior to sentencing, was fined £50, Another case, The People 
(DPP) v O'Driscoll,23 emerged from the more genteel sport of bowling, A 
spectator, who cheered for the accused's opponent, alleged that he was 
attacked by the accused and his son, causing him extensive facial injuries. 
The accused's son stated that the dispute arose over a bet and that the 
complainant had initiated the force, The accused was acquitted by direction. 
Between 1987 and 1992 four other cases were referred to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. However, no prosecution was directed in three cases 
and charges were withdrawn by the prosecution in the fourth?4 These cases 
establish little, other than confirming that sports violence has raised 
questions of criminal liability in Ireland, However, the issue has been treated 
more extensively in other common law countries and assistance can be 
derived from the resulting jurisprudence?5 It is convenient at this stage to 
20. (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 284. 
21. Indeed, where the accused pleads not guilty the prosecution faces a considerable burden to 
convince the jury that the force used was criminal; it appears that juries are prepared to 
accept explanations such as that the force employed was accidental or "in the heat of the 
moment"; see R v Davies [1991) All ER Rev 313; R v Rees [1992) All ER Rev 365; R v 
Blissett, The Times 5 December 1992.See also R v Hardy, The Independent. 27 July 1994, 
where the accused was acquitted of manslaughter. 
22. Dublin Circuit Court, 20-22 October 1987. 
23. Cork Circuit Court, 10-11 February 1993. 
24. I am indebted to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Eamonn Barnes, for his 
permission to use the foregoing information and to Ms Caitlfn Nf Fhlaitheartaigh, Legal 
Assistant, for her work in searching files and collating the material. 
25. The issue is not confined to the common-law world. A French rugby player, Georges 
Metbach, received a three-year suspended sentence and a FFrlO,OOO fine for a punch 
which broke an opponent's nose; see Irish Times, 13 November 1993. 
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consider the general issue of unlawful sports violence in relation to the rules 
of the game, and this in tum raises two discrete issues. One concerns 
unlawful violence which is tolerated by the rules of the sport, the other 
concerns unlawful violence which also violates the rules of the sport. 
UNLAWFUL VIOLENCE WHICH IS WITHIN THE RULES OF THE SPORT 
The decisions in R v Bradshaw and R v Moore indicate that the 
unlawfulness of the' violence was determined independently of the question 
whether the attack was within the rules of the game. In Bradshaw the 
relationship between the rules of the game and the lawfulness of the force 
was expressed thus by Bramwell LJ in his instruction to the jury:26 
No rules or practice of any game whatever can make lawful that which is 
unlawful by the law of the land; and the law of the land says that you shall not do 
that which is likely to cause the death of another .... But, on the other hand, if a 
man is playing according to the rules and practice of the game and not going 
beyond it, it may be reasonable to infer that he is not actuated by any malicious 
motive or intention, and that he is not acting in a manner which he knows will be 
likely to be productive of death or injury. But, independent of the rules, if the 
prisoner intended to cause serious hurt to the deceased, or if he knew that, in 
charging as he did, he might produce serious injury and was indifferent or 
reckless ... then the act would be unlawful. 
In any event in both cases the force employed was clearly and 
unquestionably outside the rules of the game. Nevertheless, the possibility is 
raised that that which is permitted by the rules might be unlawful. R v Coney 
might be useful in this respect, although it is problematic in that it is difficult 
to classify prize-fighting as a "properly constituted" sport; what occurred is 
more appropriately classified as fighting rather than sport. But it is helpful in 
as much as it indicates various underlying concerns on which the decision to 
declare the force unlawful was based. If these concerns are present in a 
particular incident it is arguable that it is equally unlawful whatever the rules 
of the game might provide. Intent to cause serious injury, the element of 
anger or hostility and the threat to public peace might be associated with 
certain episodes of sports violence. For instance, the public peace concern, 
which was discounted in Attorney-General's Reference (No 6 of 1980) 
principally to allow private violence to be declared unlawful, might have a 
bearing. If a nexus could be demonstrated between on-field violence and 
crowd disorder would it not be permissible to declare the former unlawful ?27 
Since the principal concern in the case-law was with violence which is 
intended or likely to cause serious injury the point is largely academic, as 
such force is in any event beyond the rules of most sports. But the issue could 
26. (1878) 14 Cox CC 83. 
27. The concern here is not just the belief that sporting heroes are role models for others. In 
some cases on-field violence might "spill over" into the crowd. During an ice hockey 
match between the New York Rangers and the Boston Bruins a fight broke out between 
the players. A Rangers fan reached into the arena and punched one of the Bruin players 
whereupon his team-mates climbed into the stands to avenge him; the resulting fight 
between players and fans lasted for 15 minutes; see Rains, "Sports violence - a matter 
for societal concern" (1980) 55 Notre Dame Lawyer 796. 
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arise in boxing and, possibly, some other codes which permit robust body 
contact. 
The Supreme Court of Victoria considered the matter in Pallante v 
Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1),28 a tort action the result of which depended on the 
lawfulness of professional boxing. While it is violent in the extreme, it is 
generally accepted that boxing is lawful.29 Nevertheless in Pallante 
McInerney J indicated that applications of force which are within the rules of 
a sport might nevertheless constitute an assault where the blows are intended 
to cause injury. This can be applied with some ease to boxing as there is a 
stage, often intuitively identified, at which a boxing match becomes a fight; 
it has passed from being an exhibition and testing of respective skills of the 
participants to being a blood bath. In principle, this sentiment can govern any 
sport although its application might prove difficult in practice. McInerney J 
provided an example from cricket, when he suggested, without deciding the 
issue, that "body line bowling and bouncers may raise ... separate 
problems.,,3o While the raising by an Australian of bodyline bowling is as 
predictable as the questioning by him of bouncers in the mid-l 970s is ironic, 
the point is that the unlimited bowling of bouncers was at the time permitted 
by the rules of test cricket.31 Was McInerney J hinting that it might 
nevertheless have attracted criminal liability? 
UNLAWFUL VIOLENCE WHICH BREACHES THE RULES OF THE GAME 
The question which has been considered more freqently concerns the 
lawfulness of foul play by a participant. A simple solution is that all foul play 
is unlawful since a participant's consent is limited to that which is permitted 
by the rules of the game. This, however, is untenable for several reasons. The 
first is that the acceptability of violence is a matter of legal policy not of 
private regulation. To use the rules of the sport as a test would be to confer on 
a private agency, the sport's governing body, the power to licence violence. 
A second difficulty is that such an approach would be impracticable. Trivial 
fouls which involve force would be unlawful while applications of greater 
force which are within the rules would be lawful. Third, that approach would 
not conform with social reality. Sports participants (and indeed all involved 
in sport) know and realise that they will be fouled in the course of their 
endeavours; and depending on the particular code these incidents might 
involve considerable degrees offorce. Nevertheless they participate and thus 
accept (and even expect) the inherent risks. Given this position how can it be 
28. [1976] VR 33l. 
29. Seeeg R v Brown [1993]2 All ER 75 at 79 per Lord Templeman "violent sports including 
boxing are lawful activities". 
30. [1976] VR 331 at 339. 
31. Controversy over the use of bouncers and short-pitched bowling as a form of intimidation 
has persisted in cricket. In 1991 the International Cricket Council introduced a three-year 
experimental regulation in test cricket limiting bouncers to one per over; see Wisden 
Cricketers' Almanac /993 p 1211. Nearly 60 years earlier. in the aftermath of the 
infamous "bodyline" test series between England and Australia (1932-33) rule changes 
were introduced restricting field placings which would assist "leg theory" bowling. 
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said that they do not consent to being fouled? This presents a dilemma but it 
seems clear that the law must recognise as lawful certain, if not all, foul play 
which can be expected to occur in the course of the game. If a sport is of such 
intrinsic worth as to merit legal recognition as being' 'properly constituted" 
it must follow that its normal attributes, incidents and inherent spirit attract 
equal legal recognition. The English case-law on the matter provides little 
guidance as to where the line is to be drawn. In as much as it provides any 
indication R v Billinghurs?2 suggests that the fact that a particular type of 
foul is commonly experienced in a sport (in this case punching in rugby) has 
little bearing on the matter. However, that case can hardly be considered 
strong authority for the proposition. Nor are R v Bradshaw, R v Coney and R 
v Moore of any greater assistance. The principal concern in those cases was 
to eliminate force which is intended or likely to cause harm, suggesting that 
that is the dividing line. The indications in Stephen J's judgment in Coney 
are that he had in mind force which was likely to cause serious harm33 but 
more recent cases seem to indicate the lower threshold of force which is 
likely to cause bodily harm. But if, therefore, force in sport is lawful because, 
not being intended or likely to cause harm, the consent of the participants is 
operative, that is no different from the general rule which obtains about 
consensual violence.34 On that view sport is not an exception to the rule. 
However, expressions of the rule have incorporated sport as an exception 
and thus the degree of force to which participants consent must be different. 
But what is the threshold? 
The Canadian experience35 
Canadian jurisprudence is of some assistance in this regard, the courts 
there having dealt with the issue on many occasions.36 It is no surprise that 
the splendidly robust sport of ice hockey provides the background. A now 
legendary (or infamous) fight between Ted Green of the Boston Bruins and 
Wayne Maki of the St. Louis Blues provided the starting point. During a 
collision between the players Green struck Maki in the face with his glove 
and the referee signalled a delayed penalty. It seems that Maki then 
"speared" Green and a stick fight ensued with Green swinging his stick at 
Maki. Maki returned the blow, striking Green on the head and causing him 
quite severe injuries. The entire incident lasted about ten seconds. Both 
players were charged and tried separately. In R v Makp7 the accused was 
32. [1976] Crim LR 553. 
33. See Pallante v Stadiums Pry Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331 at 340. 
34. R v Brown [1993]2 All ER 75; Attomey-General's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 
715. 
35. See generally White, "Sports violence as criminal assault; the development of doctrine by 
Canadian courts" [1986] Duke U 1030. 
36. Section 265(1)(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides that a person commits an 
assault when "without the consent of another person" he intentionally applies force to 
that other, directly or indirectly. Although absence of consent is an ingredient of the actus 
reus it is now established that the law imposes limits on a person's capacity to consent, and 
the position is broadly similar to that which obtains at common law; see R v lobidon 
(1991) 66 CCC (3d) 454. 
37. [1970] 14 DLR (3d) 164. 
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charged with assault causing bodily harm. He was acquitted since the trial 
judge entertained doubts as to whether he intended to injure Green, whether 
he was under a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm and whether he used 
excessive force in the circumstances. But had there been no doubt on the 
self-defence question Carter PC] stated that he would have convicted the 
accused. He endorsed the view that the consent given by sports participants 
is limited, citing Stephen l' s judgment in R v Coney. He concluded that when 
a player participates in a sport he accepts certain risks and hazards and that 
the defence of consent would normally be applicable. But this was a question 
of degree and 'no player should be considered "to accept malicious, 
unprovoked and overly violent attack.' ,38 The companion case R v Green39 
also resulted in an acquittal, with the trial judge in that case taking a 
somewhat different view of the facts. Fitzpatrick PC] found as a fact that 
Maki "speared" Green in the lower abdomen and that Green's almost 
immediate response amounted to nothing more than instinctive 
self-protection. His earlier" gloving" of Maki was an ordinary happening in 
ice hockey which had no criminal significance. On the general question of 
consent, Fitzpatrick PC] observed that players consent to a considerable 
number of assaults because ice hockey could not be played with its 
customary speed, force, vigour and competitiveness without a great degree 
of forceful body contact. 
Whilst Maki and Green resulted in acquittals they established that there 
is a threshold of unlawful violence in sport. However, no clear dividing line 
was drawn and few indications as to its identification emerge, other than an 
implicit suggestion in Green that the nature of the sport would be a criterion. 
Subsequent Canadian decisions generated a number of different formulae. In 
R v Leyte40 it was said that players are deemed to consent to acts resulting 
from instinctive reactions closely related to the play since such reactions 
usually negative intent. In R v Watson41 consent was limited to routine body 
contact in the game. In R v Malone/2 it was held that a participant consents 
to assaults which are inherent in and reasonably related to the normal playing 
of the game; if, however, the accused's intent was to inflict serious injury he 
would be guilty whether or not that injury in fact resulted. In R v St Croix43 
the accused who struck an opponent after play had stopped was found guilty 
as the act went "beyond foreseeable consented to behaviour" and was not 
done instinctively or in self-defence. This variety illustrates the difficulty in 
devising a workable formula which reconciles the legitimacy of socially 
acceptable (and beneficial) violence with the equal need to protect 
participants from wanton violence. In effect these decisions left considerable 
leeway to triers of fact who were to determine whether the violence was 
related to or connected with the playing of the game. This has the merit of 
attempting to recognise as lawful that which is within the nature and spirit of 
38. Citing Agar v Canning (1965) 54 WWR 302, a civil action. 
39. [1970] 16 DLR (3d) 137. 
40. (1973) 13 CCC (2d) 458. 
41. (1975) 26 CCC (2d) 150. 
42. (1976) 28 CCC (2d) 323. 
43. (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 122. 
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the sport but is open to the criticism of being unworkably vague and, in 
consequence, of allowing too much latitude to overtly violent players.44 
More recent appellate decisions in Canada have attempted to provide 
clearer guidance and in so doing have possibly restricted the level of lawful 
violence. In R v Cel5 the accused cross-checked an opponent from the rear 
pushing his face into the boards surrounding the ice-rink; the opponent 
suffered facial injuries, concussion and whiplash but rather sportingly 
indicated that the experience would not deter him from playing in the future. 
The accused was acquitted on the basis that he had not intended to cause 
injury or to apply any force greater than that which is customary for the 
game. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and 
ordered a retrial. The relevant question, according to the majority, was 
whether the force employed was' 'so violent and inherently dangerous as to 
have been excluded from the implied consent." The court set out a 
framework within which the scope of the participant's implied consent is to 
be considered. It identified the conditions in which the game is played, the 
nature of the act, the degree and risk of injury and the probability of serious 
harm occurring as relevant criteria when determining the extent of the 
consent implied by participation. Moreover, the majority considered 
Attorney-General's Reference (No 6 of 1980y46 to be applicable in Canada 
and saw no reason in principle that it should not apply to sport, but with the 
modification that it would be confined to force in which injury is intended 
rather than that which causes harm. 
The significance of Cey is twofold. First, by spelling out the factors 
which should be taken into account it attempts to provide the detail necessary 
to depart from the vagueness of the tests suggested in earlier decisions. 
Second, it marks a shift in emphasis in that it is considerably less tolerant of 
sports violence. It is not improbable that had it applied in earlier cases fewer 
acquittals would have resulted. It clearly establishes that violent and 
dangerous conduct which can be expected in the course of the game exceeds 
the implied consent. In this respect the identification of the concern which 
underlies the issue, namely the risk of serious injury, is instructive. Thus, 
where the conduct is such as to carry a high risk of injury it will be unlawful 
regardless of consent or of the frequency with which it occurs in the sport. 
With that in mind the threshold of permitted force will vary according to the 
game's circumstances. It is conceivable that force which is permitted at one 
44. In practice prosecutions were more likely to be successful where force was applied after 
play had stopped or where the victim was uninvolved in a melee or was withdrawing from 
it: seeR v Henderson [1976)5 WWR 119; Re Duchesneau (1978) 7 CR (3d) 70; R v Gray 
[1981) 6 WWR 654; R v Cote (1981) 22 CR (3d) 97. Delayed retaliatory action has 
received a mixed response; R v Watson (1975) 26 CCC (2d) 150 resulted in a conviction 
whileR. v Maloney (1976) 28 CCC (2d) 333 resulted in an acquittal. In R v Tevaga [1991) 
I NZLR 296 a fight developed during an under-21 rugby game; the accused chased an 
opponent 25 yards from the brawl, struck him breaking his jaw; in upholding the 
conviction the New Zealand Court of Appeal considered this to be worse than some 
assaults committed in the heat of a maul. See also State v Floyd (1991) 466 NW 2d 919 
discussed below at nn 57-59. 
45. (1989) 48 CCC (3d) 480. 
46. [1981) QB 715, citing the passage quoted at n 13 above. 
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level in a sport would be impermissible at a different level. For instance, 
there are indications that that which is acceptable in a professional game 
might not be permitted in an amateur setting;47 likewise greater latitude 
could be expected at senior level than at junior or underage level.48 
However, the decision creates a conceptual difficulty, which will be 
considered later, in its view that implied consent is to be determined by 
reference to objective criteria.49 
R v Cey has been adopted in two Ontario decisions. In R v Ciccarelli50 
the Cey test was considered to be preferable to one which permits that which 
can be expected to happen during a game. The latter, in the view of Corbett 
DCI, panders to the public appetite for violence.51 In R v Leclerc52 the 
Ontario Court of Appeal applied the same test but added as a criterion the 
question whether the rules of the game contemplate contact. 53 However, the 
latter would not be dispositive of the issue as indeed the case itself 
demonstrates. There the force was inflicted during an industrial league ice 
hockey match the rules of which excluded body contact. The trial judge 
concluded that the blow inflicted was an instinctive reaction and of a type 
which all players at that level expected and accepted as part of the game. On 
appeal the court refused to overturn the acquittal since the blow was not of an 
inherently violent nature. The application of Cey to ~orts has been 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v ]obidon, 5 where the court 
adopted the test in Attorney-General's Reference (No 6 of 1980) as 
applicable in Canada and rejected the so-called "fair fight" defence. It 
stated that, unlike fights, sports have a significant social value and endorsed 
Cey as apposite. 
The American experience 
In contrast to Canada the criminal law on sports violence is 
comparatively undeveloped in the United States. A prosecution was brought 
for aggravated assault allegedly committed during a professional ice hockey 
47. See R v St Croix (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 122. 
48. This is partly reflected in the rules of certain sports which restrict the contacts permitted at 
underage and junior level. Lenfield [1993] Aust Torts R 81-222, a criminal injury 
compensation application involved ajunior form of rugby league called "tackle"; a game 
was joined by two older boys one of whom' 'spear" tackled the applicant (ie lifted him 
into the air and drove him head first towards the ground); the Supreme Court of ACT took 
account of the disparity in height and weight between the boys. In Sibley v Milutinovic 
[1990] Aust Torts R 81-013 a distinction was drawn between friendly and competitive 
matches. 
49. See below at nn 70-71. 
50. (1989) 54 CCC (3d) 121. 
51. The court rejected the test suggested by Glanville Williams, "Consent and Public Policy" 
[1962] Crim LR 74 at 81. 
52. (1991) 67 CCC (3d) 563. 
53. See also Smith v Emerson [1986] Aust Torts R 80-022, a civil action the outcome of which 
depended on whether the blows delivered fell within the rules of the game. 
54. (1991) 66 CCC (3d) 454. 
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game in State v Forbes. 55 There, as they returned to the ice having served a 
time penalty, the accused swung at an opponent striking him in the face with 
his stick; the opponent fell to the ice covering his seriously injured face while 
the accused repeatedly pummelled him on the ground until pulled off by 
other players. The opponent required three operations to repair a damaged 
eye socket and he suffered double vision for eight months. The trial, 
somewhat amazingly, ended in a hung verdict and the District Attorney 
declined to order a retrial. As in R v Green, State v Free~6 illustrates the 
difference between consensual violence and that which is non-consensual. 
There a New York District Court convicted the accused youth for an assault 
committed during an American football game. The accused had been 
punched by the complainant during a tackle. When the resulting pile-up had 
been cleared the accused, in obvious retaliation, punched the complainant in 
the eye. The court held that while the first punch might have been consented 
to, the accused's punch fell outside the ambit of the implied consent since his 
act was clearly intentional. Somewhat different reasoning was employed by 
the Iowa Court of Appeals in State v FloyJ37 where the accused became 
involved in a bench-clearing brawl following a break in play during a 
basketball game. Iowa law provides that an act is not an assault when the 
parties are "voluntary participants in a sport ... and such act is a reasonably 
foreseeable incident of such sport ... and does not create an unreasonable 
risk of serious injury or breach of the peace ... ,,58 The court concluded that 
the accused and some of his victims were not voluntary participants in sport 
at the time of the brawl - they had been on the sidelines and were not 
engaged in play when the brawl began. 59 
Little assistance can be derived from the American decisions. However, 
developments in tort liability have some potential and might provide a useful 
test in the criminal sphere.6o The Restatement (Second) of Torts draws a 
distinction between rules which are designed to secure the better playing of 
the game as a test of skill (game rules) and those which are designed to 
protect players (safety rules). Players are considered to consent to, and 
assume the risks inherent in, violations of game rules. However, liability 
55. No 63280 (1975, Minnesota District Court). Although unreported, the case is much 
discussed; see eg Binder, "The consent defence: sports, violence and the criminal law" 
(1975) 13 Am Crim LRev 235; Kuhlmann, "Violence in professional sports" [1975] Wis 
LRev 771; Note, "Consent in criminal law: violence in sports" (1976) 75 Mich LRev 148; 
Hechter, "The criminal law and violence in sports" (1977) 19 Crim LQ 425. 
56. (1976) 86 Misc 2d 280. 
57. (1991) 466 NW 2d 919. 
58. Iowa Penal Code §708.1. 
59. Even had the accused been a participant the court would not have been disposed to finding 
that his acts were reasonably incident to basketball or that there was no risk of serious 
injury or breach of the peace; (1991) 466 NW 919 at 923. 
60. See eg Hackbart v Cincinnati Bengals Inc (1979) 60 I F 2d 516 - professional footballer 
held liable for reckless misconduct during game; Bourque v Duplechin (1976) 331 So 40 
- player held liable for reckless lack of concern during amateur softball game; see 
generally Prosser and Keeton, Torts. 5th ed (St Paul. 1984) pp 112-15. In these islands tort 
liability for sports conduct has been considered in McComiskey v McDermott [1974] IR 75 
and Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866. 
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would attach to a breach of a safety rule.61 Support for this approach can be 
found in Nabozny V Bamhilf'2 where the court held that the standard of care 
owed to a fellow competitor is to refrain from conduct proscribed by a safety 
rule. The assumption of risk defence was negated by the violation of a safety 
rule causing a dangerous situation to which the plaintiff could not consent. 
This approach, it would appear, applies with equal force to amateur and 
professional sportS.63 The advantage of this approach is that it draws a 
readily identifiable line between permitted force and that which attracts 
liability and thus should facilitate ease of application. Moreover, it shares 
with the criminal law a concern to protect participants from excessively 
dangerous play. 
A WORKABLE TEST FOR SPORTS VIOLENCE? 
The more workable tests are the Canadian Cey test and the violation of 
safety rule test which emerges from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In 
practice there would probably be little difference in application between 
them, as both are ultimately concerned with player protection. The relevant 
factors in determining which violence is inherently dangerous are expressly 
incorporated into the Cey test: age, level of experience, conditions of play 
and the like. Thus, it is likely that different thresholds will apply in different 
sports contexts. What is acceptable in, say, international rugby would be 
unacceptable at underage level. The adoption, albeit in modified form, in 
Cey of the Attomey-General's Reference (No 6 of 1980) is, however, 
somewhat problematic. It could be taken to mean that the application in sport 
of force which is intended to result in bodily harm is unlawful, but that seems 
to set the threshold too low. Many commonly accepted contacts are 
deliberately forceful or intimidatory. For instance, many accept that a rugby 
tackle can have the dual purpose of preventing an opponent from gaining an 
advantage and of "softening up" the opponent; the latter purpose is 
considered to be part of the physical challenge, to be essential to the contest 
between rival players. In this regard, the lawfulness of professional boxing 
proves most difficult to rationalise. It is clear that boxers, as an inherent part 
of the contest, intend to inflict degrees of force which, on any reckoning, 
exceed the bodily harm threshold. Mcinerney J's careful analysis in Pallante 
v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1)64 of the lawfulness of professional boxing centred 
on the absence of hostility from boxing which distinguished it from unlawful 
fighting. Although admirable in its efforts it is difficult to be convinced by 
61. Restatement (Second) of Torts. §50. Comment b states that "[t]aking part in a game 
manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily contacts or restrictions of liberty as are 
permitted by its rules or usages. Participating in such a game does not manifest consent to 
contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of the game if such rules or usages are 
designed to protect the participants and not merely to secure the better playing of the game 
as a test of skill. This is true although a player knows that those with or against whom he is 
playing are habitual violators of such rules." 
62. (1975) 31 III App 3d 212. See Rains, "Sports violence: a matter for societal concern" 
(1980) 55 Notre Dame Lawyer 796. 
63. But see Beumler, "Liability in professional sports; an alternative to violence?" (1980) 22 
Ariz L Rev 919 arguing that different standards apply. 
64. [1976] VR 331. 
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McInerney 1's reasoning, especially as hostility has been rejected as being a 
central element of unlawful violence.65 A better, but intellectually less 
satisfying, explanation is provided by Lord Mustill in his dissenting speech 
in R v Brown, namely that boxing is a special case which' 'stands outside the 
ordinary law of violence because society chooses to tolerate it" .66 
The advantage of the violation of a safety rule test is that it draws a clear 
and distinct line between that which is lawful and that which is not. Although 
it defers in part to a private agency to determine the scope of liability -
safety rules are enacted by the governing body of the sport - the function of 
safety rules coincides with the primary concern of the criminal law in this 
sphere. Indeed it is difficult to imagine any circumstance where the 
intentional or reckless violation of a safety rule would not be criminal, 
applying any of the tests which have emerged. Moreover, the test adequately 
differentiates trivial fouls, whiCh might incidentally result in injury, from 
calculatedly dangerous play. For instance, a high tackle violates a safety rule 
and its inherent danger is obvious. On the other hand, obstruction violates a 
game rule; it is not in the ordinary course of events inherently dangerous but 
in unfortunate circumstances serious injury might result due, say, to the state 
of the pitch or the manner of the player's fall. The distinction between the 
two fouls seems to be sufficiently obvious as to justify penal ising the 
offender in the former case while absolving him in the latter. A further 
advantage with this test is that by not focusing on the presence of intent to 
inflict bodily harm it is sufficiently flexible to preserve the fundamental 
characteristics of different sports within the legal framework. The safety 
rules of some sports permit the infliction of force from which bodily harm is 
likely to result. If bodily harm were the general threshold many inflictions of 
force allowed by the rules would be potentially criminal. On the other hand, 
to define lawful violence in terms of a higher threshold, say serious bodily 
harm, would allow too much scope in sports where the safety rules are more 
exacting. Of course, this is subject to the residual power of the criminal law 
to declare unlawful that which is permitted by the rules if it conflicts with 
some aspect of the public interest. 
THE QUESTION OF CONSENT 
So far the issue of permissible violence has been considered in relation to 
the consent which is to be implied from participation. This, of course, is 
central to much of the jurisprudence and commentaries on the subject. Thus, 
it is said that when a player participates in a sport he impliedly consents to a 
certain degree of body contact associated with the sport - this is the 
threshold of permissible violence with which much of the jurisprudence is 
concerned. By the same token it is said that there is no consent, or what 
consent might be present is ineffective, where the violence exceeds the 
threshold. One can identify several conceptual difficulties with this view. 
65. See Faulkner v Talbot [1981)3 All ER 468; In re F(Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990) 
2 AC I. The suggestion in Wilson v Pringle [1987) QB 237 that hostile touching is an 
essential element of an assault is inaccurate. 
66. [1993]2 All ER 75 at 109; but see per Lord Slynn of Hadley at 121, considering passages 
in Pallante to be helpful. 
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The first is that an implied consent may be expressly revoked. However, it 
could hardly be said in the context of sports that participants could revoke 
their consent to the routine body contacts of the game any more than a 
pedestrian could revoke his implied consent to the routine body contact 
which results from the normal hustle and bustle of the High Street. The 
second, which is related, is that the notion of implied consent is increasingly 
falling into disfavour as an explanation for the lawfulness of particular 
applications of force and recourse is had to other explanations.67 Third, 
consent is inferred from the belief that a player assumes certain risks by 
participating in the game.68 But to do something in the knowledge that a 
certain consequence is either probable or likely does not automatically mean 
that the actor has consented to that consequence occurring. I might choose to 
walk home late at night through a violent district but it does not follow that I 
consent to the near-inevitable mugging which I receive, much less that the 
assault is rendered lawful by my supposed consent.69 What this example 
illustrates is that often the question of consent is determined by reference to 
other legally relevant criteria. Thus, a player who participates in a 
notoriously violent game cannot be considered, from his participation alone, 
to consent to its inherent risks. If in fact he consents effectively, that is a 
conclusion drawn as a matter of legal policy and invokes interests other than 
those of the individual participant. Fourth, in relation to team sports it would 
seem that there should be a uniform consent from all players rather than as 
many different consents as there are players; in other words, the threshold 
must be the same for all. It was with this in mind that the court in R v Celo 
held that the scope of the implied consent must be determined by reference to 
objective criteria. There is nothing objectionable in evaluating the 
lawfulness of violence in relation to such criteria, and there is much to be 
said in support of the Cey test. But to formulate the resulting rule in terms of 
implied consent is inappropriate since consent, being a state of mind, is 
necessarily subjective. In reality, this consent, or lack of consent as the case 
may be, is attributed to the participant by operation oflaw; it is a supposed or 
deemed consent rather than a real consent. It would be better to explain the 
lawfulness of force which falls beneath the threshold on the ground that it is 
67. See In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990]2 AC I; Prosser and Keeton, Torts, 5th 
ed (St Paul, 1984) pp 117-18; but see Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Toronto, 
1987) p 476 suggesting that contact sports provide the best example of implied consent. 
68. There is some confusion between consent and voluntary assumption of risk and it might be 
more accurate to speak in terms of assumption of risk rather than consent. A player accepts 
the risk that he will be tackled within (and sometimes beyond) the rules of the game but his 
endeavours are directed towards avoiding that occurrence. Nevertheless the law has 
employed the concept of consent to evaluate the lawfulness of the force applied. The 
question was alluded to in an Australian civil case, Smith v Emerson (1986) Aust Torts R 
80-022 where it was stated that consent is the proper defence to raise in an action for an 
intentional tort, while voluntary assumption of risk is appropriate in an action for 
negligence. 
69. See Note, "Consent in criminal law: violence in sports" (1976) 75 Mich L Rev 148 at 
154-5. 
70. (1989) 48 CCC (3d) 480. 
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tolerated by society as being acceptable in the course of sporting activity.71 If 
a player chooses to participate he will not be heard to object to lawfully 
inflicted force, whatever his subjective state of mind might be. This might 
not be intellectually appealing but at least it is closer to social reality than the 
alternative. Of equal importance, it brings to the surface the policy issues 
which underlie the law in this area. 
THE POLICY ISSUES 
The questions of policy which underlie the law in this area are largely 
shaped by those which govern the law of violence generally. They are 
modified by the recognition of the social benefit and value which is derived 
from competing in, or witnessing, sport. Hence the tolerance of a threshold 
of violence which would be. otherwise unlawful. But in attempting to 
identify the appropriate level at which to set the threshold consideration of 
the policy issues is unavoidable. A number can be identified and outlined. 
The first is a concern that private agreement or regulation cannot override or 
negate the demands of the criminallaw.72 This concern is met by the law in 
two ways. In some, albeit limited, instances violence which is permitted by a 
sport's rules will nevertheless be adjudged unlawful usually because it 
exceeds that which as a matter of legal policy is tolerable.73 In other 
instances the tests employed to identify which foul play is also unlawful 
meet the concern of the law to punish needlessly violent conduct. In 
particular, we have seen that the more workable tests, the Cey test and the 
violation of a safety rule test, share with the criminal law a concern for player 
protection.74 In other words, the danger which is inherent in the conduct is 
considered sufficiently grave as to merit legal regulation, a matter which is 
recognised in the jurisprudence.75 An alternative formulation is that conduct 
which exceeds the bounds of human decency is a matter of public concern,76 
as is conduct which tends to diminish self-restraint and to reduce the 
inhibitions to the point where the actor might not care about the 
consequences of his conduct. 77 While these policy concerns overlap 
71. See Note, "Consent in criminal law: violence in sports" (1976) 75 MichLRev 148 at ISS 
and 160 applying to sport a German concept "Sozialadaquanz" which focusses on the 
inconveniences which society will allow its members to tolerate. An athlete is expected to 
suffer certain inconveniences (injuries) in order to facilitate the playing of the game; but 
the game is part of a wider society and must necessarily conform to the standards which 
that society demands or allows. 
72. See R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
73. See text at nn 26-31 above. 
74. See text at nn 45-54 and 60-63 above. 
75. See R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534; State v Brown (1976) 364 A 2d 27; R v Cey (1989) 48 
CCC (3d) 480. 
76. See Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford, 1979) pp 184-85. 
77. See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) pp 770-71; see also State v Brown (1976) 
364 A 2d 27. Similar reasoning is found in some of the speeches inR v Brown (1993) 2 All 
ER 75. 
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significantly they might suggest a greater or lesser degree of tolerance.78 
However, since their common purpose is to identify a threshold of 
unacceptable behaviour it is better to express the rule in terms of the danger 
posed by the assault rather than in terms of conduct which is intended or 
likely to cause harm of a specified degree. Therefore, I suggest that the better 
tests are the Cey test and the violation of safety rule test. Both are directed 
towards protecting participants from inherently dangerous conduct and, at 
the same time, meet the pragmatic concern of being sufficiently precise to 
allow ease of application in courts of trial. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The subject matter of this essay might make depressing reading for those 
who are imbued with a sense of Corinthian idealism. While most who 
display a passion for sport might share that romantic dream, it must be 
tempered with a dash of realism. Recent experience, sporting, judicial and 
legislative, has amply demonstrated the fact that the law and sport are well 
nigh impossible to divorce. It is possible that many of the concerns which 
have been identified in this essay can be adequately dealt with through other 
mechanisms. For instance, rule and equipment changes could conceivably 
reduce the risk of injury to participants and, consequently, the temptation to 
use dangerous violence. Such measures have been adopted by different 
sports in recent years, the most notable being the' 'one bouncer per over" 
rule in cricket and the compulsory wearing of shin guards in soccer.79 But 
despite these efforts, sports administrators and establishments have not 
always shown themselves to be capable of appropriately exercising 
self-regulation.8o The serious problems of crowd disorder and spectator 
safety in English soccer eventually required legislative action.81 With regard 
to participant violence it would seem that the law will inevitably playa 
controlling role. It is not improbable that the imposition of civil liability will 
have a greater deterrent effect in many sports contexts and that recourse to 
criminal prosecution will prove happily infrequent. Nevertheless, as the 
criminal law is the forum through which communal standards of acceptable 
conduct are enforced the sensitive exercise of prosecutorial discretion will 
78. Another, different, concern, namely preserving public peace, was alluded to earlier; see 
text at nn 26-27. No doubt it would be considered permissible to penalise on-field violence 
which has a propensity to encourage spectator unrest, even where that conduct might not 
threaten the safety of participants. Nevertheless, recourse to public order offences might 
be more appropriate. Indeed, in several cases in Scotland soccer players who made 
"unwarranted" gestures towards spectators have been prosecuted for public order 
offences. 
79. Hechter, "The criminal law and violence in sports" (1977) Crim LQ 425 at 441 suggests 
that the wearing of batting helmets has eliminated "beanball" wars in baseball; but see 
Nielsen, "Controlling sports violence: too late for carrots - bring the big stick" (1989) 
74 Iowa L Rev 681 at 684 noting more recent "beanings" in baseball. 
80. See Horrow, "Violence in professional sports; is it part of the gameT' (1982) 9 J 
Legislation I. 
8!. Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1986; Public Order Act 1986; Fire Safety 
and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987. 
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be both necessary, and it is hoped, will prove educative and socially 
beneficial. 
J. PAUL McCUTCHEON* 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Limerick. 
